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Abstract
Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions as
adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. These actions modify an election’s par-
ticipation structure and aim at either making a favorite candidate win (“constructive control”)
or prevent a despised candidate from winning (“destructive control”), which yields a total of
22 standard control scenarios. To protect elections from such control attempts, computational
complexity has been used to show that electoral control, though not impossible, is computa-
tionally prohibitive. Among natural voting systems with a polynomial-time winner problem,
the two systems with the highest number of proven resistances to control types (namely 19 out
of 22 [ENR09, ER10, EPR10]) are “sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting” (SP-
AV, a modification [ENR09] of a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [BS06]) and fallback
voting [BS09]. Both are hybrid systems; e.g., fallback voting combines approval with Bucklin
voting. In this paper, we study the control complexity of Bucklin voting itself and show that
it behaves equally well in terms of control resistance for the 20 cases investigated so far. As
Bucklin voting is a special case of fallback voting, all resistances shown for Bucklin voting in
this paper strengthen the corresponding resistance for fallback voting shown in [EPR10].
1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper of Bartholdi et al. [BTT92], the complexity of electoral control—changing
the outcome of an election via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or
voters—has been studied for a variety of voting systems. Unlike manipulation [BTT89, BO91,
∗Supported in part by the DFG under grants RO 1202/12-1 (within the European Science Foundation’s EUROCORES
program LogICCC: “Computational Foundations of Social Choice”) and RO 1202/11-1. Work done in part while the first
and third author were visiting NICTA, Sydney, and the University of Newcastle. Some results for Bucklin voting in the
present paper supersede the corresponding result for fallback voting shown in [EPR10].
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CSL07, FHHR09a], which models attempts of strategic voters to influence the outcome of an elec-
tion via casting insincere votes, control models ways of an external actor, the “chair,” to tamper with
an election’s participation structure so as to alter its outcome. Another way of tampering with the
outcome of elections is bribery [FHH09, FHHR09a], which shares with manipulation the feature
that votes are being changed, and with control the aspect that an external actor tries to change the
outcome of the election. Faliszewski et al. [FHHR09b] survey known complexity results for control,
manipulation, and bribery.
Elections have been used for preference aggregation not only in the context of politics and
human societies, but also in artificial intelligence, especially in multiagent systems, and other topics
in computer science (see, e.g., [ER97, GMHS99, DKNS01]). That is why it is important to study
the computational properties of voting systems. In particular, complexity can be used to protect
elections against tampering attempts in control, manipulation, and bribery attacks by showing that
such attacks, though not impossible in principle, are computationally prohibitive.
Regarding control, a central question is to find voting systems that are computationally resistant
to as many of the common 22 control types as possible, where resistance means the corresponding
control problem is NP-hard. Each control type is either constructive (the chair seeking to make
some candidate win) or destructive (the chair seeking to make some candidate not end up winning).
Erde´lyi and Rothe [ER10] proved that fallback voting [BS09], a hybrid voting system combining
Bucklin with approval voting, is resistant to each of these 22 standard control types except five types
of voter control. They proved that fallback voting is vulnerable to two of those control types (i.e.,
these control problems are polynomial-time solvable), leaving the other three cases open. Erde´lyi,
Piras and Rothe [EPR10] recently proved that fallback voting is resistant to constructive and de-
structive control by partition of voters in the tie-handling model “ties promote.”
Thus fallback voting is not only fully resistant to candidate control [ER10] but also fully re-
sistant to constructive control. In terms of the total number of proven resistances it draws level
with “sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting” (SP-AV, another hybrid system proposed
by Brams and Sanver [BS06]): Both have the most (19 out of 22) proven resistances to con-
trol among natural voting systems with a polynomial-time winner problem. Among such sys-
tems, only plurality and SP-AV were previously known to be fully resistant to candidate control
[BTT92, HHR07, ENR09], and only Copeland voting and SP-AV were previously known to be
fully resistant to constructive control [FHHR09a, ENR09]. However, plurality has fewer resistances
to voter control, Copeland voting has fewer resistances to destructive control, and SP-AV is arguably
less natural a system than fallback voting [ENR09, BEH+09].
Even more natural than fallback voting, however, is Bucklin voting itself, one of its two con-
stituent systems. After all, fallback voting is a hybrid system in which voters are required to provide
two types of preference (a ranking of candidates and an approval vector), whereas in Bucklin vot-
ing it is enough for the voters to rank the candidates. Moreover, Bucklin voting has the important
property that it is majority-consistent, which means that whenever a majority candidate exists,1 he
or she is the (unique) Bucklin winner. In contrast, fallback voting is not majority-consistent.
In this paper, we study the control complexity of Bucklin voting and show that it has as many
control resistances as fallback voting in the 20 cases investigated so far. In particular, Bucklin voting
1A majority candidate is a candidate that is ranked at top position in more than half of the votes.
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is also fully resistant to both candidate control and constructive control.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some basic notions from social choice theory,
and in particular Bucklin voting, as well as the 22 standard types of control are defined. Our results
on the control complexity of Bucklin voting are presented in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 provides
some conclusions and open questions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Elections and Voting Systems
An election (C,V ) is given by a finite set C of candidates and a finite list V of votes over C. A voting
system is a rule that specifies how to determine the winner(s) of any given election. The two voting
systems considered in this paper are Bucklin voting and fallback voting.
In Bucklin voting, votes are represented as linear orders over C, i.e., each voter ranks all candi-
dates according to his or her preferences. For example, if C = {a,b,c,d} then a vote might look like
c d a b, i.e., this voter (strictly) prefers c to d, d to a, and a to b. Given an election (C,V ) and
a candidate c ∈ C, define the level i score of c in (C,V ) (denoted by scorei(C,V )(c)) as the number
of votes in V that rank c among their top i positions. Denoting the strict majority threshold for a
list V of voters by maj(V ) = ⌊‖V‖/2⌋+1, the Bucklin score of c in (C,V ) is the smallest i such that
scorei(C,V )(c) ≥ maj(V ). All candidates with a smallest Bucklin score, say k, and a largest level k
score are the Bucklin winners (BV winners, for short) in (C,V ). If some candidate becomes a Buck-
lin winner on level k, we call him or her a level k BV winner in (C,V ). Note that a level 1 BV winner
must be unique, but there may be more level k BV winners than one for k > 1, i.e., an election may
have more than one Bucklin winner in general.
As a notation, when a vote contains a subset of the candidate set, such as c D a for a subset
D ⊆ C, this is a shorthand for c d1 · · · dℓ a, where the elements of D = {d1, . . . ,dℓ} are ranked
with respect to some (tacitly assumed) fixed ordering of all candidates in C. For example, if C =
{a,b,c,d} and D = {b,d} then “c D a” is a shorthand for the vote c b d a.
2.2 Types of Electoral Control
There are 11 types of electoral control, each coming in two variants. In constructive con-
trol [BTT92], the chair tries to make his or her favorite candidate win; in destructive con-
trol [HHR07], the chair tries to prevent a despised candidate’s victory. We refrain from giving a
detailed discussion of real-life scenarios for each of these 22 standard control types that motivate
them; these can be found in, e.g., [BTT92, HHR07, FHHR09a, HHR09, ENR09]. However, we
stress that every control type is motivated by an appropriate real-life scenario.
We start with partition of voters with the tie-handling rule “ties promote” (TP), see Hemaspaan-
dra et al. [HHR07]. This control type produces a two-stage election with two first-stage and one
final-stage subelections. The constructive variant of this problem is:
Name: CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY PARTITION OF VOTERS IN TP.
Instance: A set C of candidates, a list V of votes over C, and a designated candidate c ∈C.
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Question: Can V be partitioned into V1 and V2 such that c is the unique winner of the two-stage
election in which the winners of the two first-stage subelections, (C,V1) and (C,V2), run
against each other in the final stage?
The destructive variant of this problem is defined analogously, except it asks whether c is not
a unique winner of this two-stage election. In both variants, if one uses the tie-handling model
TE (“ties eliminate,” see [HHR07]) instead of TP in the two first-stage subelections, a winner w
of (C,V1) or (C,V2) proceeds to the final stage if and only if w is the only winner of his or her
subelection. Each of the four problems just defined models “two-district gerrymandering.”
There are many ways of introducing new voters into an election—think, e.g., of “get-out-the-
vote” drives, or of lowering the age-limit for the right to vote, or of attracting new voters with certain
promises or even small gifts), and such scenarios are modeled as CONSTRUCTIVE/DESTRUCTIVE
CONTROL BY ADDING VOTERS: Given a set C of candidates, two disjoint lists of votes over C
(one list, V , corresponding to the already registered voters and the other list, W , corresponding
to the as yet unregistered voters whose votes may be added), a designated candidate c ∈ C, and a
nonnegative integer k, is there a subset W ′ ⊆ W such that ‖W ′‖ ≤ k and c is (is not) the unique
winner in (C,V ∪W ′)?
Disenfranchisement and other means of voter suppression is modeled as CONSTRUC-
TIVE/DESTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY DELETING VOTERS: Given a set C of candidates, a list V
of votes over C, a designated candidate c ∈ C, and a nonnegative integer k, can one make c the
unique winner (not a unique winner) of the election resulting from deleting at most k votes from V ?
Having defined these eight standard types of voter control, we now turn to the 14 types of
candidate control. Now, the control action seeks to influence the outcome of an election by either
adding, deleting, or partitioning the candidates, again for both the constructive and the destructive
variant.
In the adding candidates cases, we distinguish between adding, from a given pool of spoiler can-
didates, an unlimited number of such candidates (as originally defined by Bartholdi et al. [BTT92])
and adding a limited number of spoiler candidates (as defined by Faliszewski et al. [FHHR09a],
to stay in sync with the problem format of control by deleting candidates and by adding/deleting
voters). CONSTRUCTIVE/DESTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING (A LIMITED NUMBER OF) CAN-
DIDATES, is defined as follows: Given two disjoint candidate sets, C and D, a list V of votes over
C ∪D, a designated candidate c ∈ C, and a nonnegative integer k, can one find a subset D′ ⊆ D
such that ‖D′‖ ≤ k and c is (is not) the unique winner in (C∪D′,V )? The “unlimited” version of
the problem is the same, except that the addition limit k and the requirement “‖D′‖ ≤ k” are being
dropped, so any subset of the spoiler candidates may be added.
CONSTRUCTIVE/DESTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY DELETING CANDIDATES is defined by: Given
a set C of candidates, a list V of votes over C, a designated candidate c ∈ C, and a nonnegative
integer k, can one make c the unique winner (not a unique winner) of the election resulting from
deleting at most k candidates (other than c in the destructive case) from C?
Finally, we define the partition-of-candidate cases, again using either of the two tie-handling
models, TP and TE, but now we define these scenarios with and without a run-off. The variant with
run-off, CONSTRUCTIVE/DESTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY RUN-OFF PARTITION OF CANDIDATES,
is analogous to the partition-of-voters control type: Given a set C of candidates, a list V of votes
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over C, and a designated candidate c ∈C, can C be partitioned into C1 and C2 such that c is (is not)
the unique winner of the two-stage election in which the winners of the two first-stage subelections,
(C1,V ) and (C2,V ), who survive the tie-handling rule run against each other in the final stage? The
variant without run-off is the same, except that the winners of first-stage subelection (C1,V ) who
survive the tie-handling rule run against (C2,V ) in the final round (and not against the winners of
(C2,V ) surviving the tie-handling rule).2
2.3 Immunity, Susceptibility, Resistance, and Vulnerability
Let CT be a control type. We say a voting system is immune to CT if it is impossible for the chair
to make the given candidate the unique winner in the constructive case (not a unique winner in the
destructive case) via exerting control of type CT. We say a voting system is susceptible to CT if
it is not immune to CT. A voting system that is susceptible to CT is said to be vulnerable to CT
if the control problem corresponding to CT can be solved in polynomial time, and is said to be
resistant to CT if the control problem corresponding to CT is NP-hard. These notions are due to
Bartholdi et al. [BTT92] (except that we follow the now more common approach of Hemaspaandra
et al. [HHR09] who define resistant to mean “susceptible and NP-hard” rather than “susceptible and
NP-complete”).
3 Results
3.1 Overview
Table 1 shows in boldface our results on the control complexity of Bucklin voting. For comparison,
this table also shows the results for fallback voting that are due to Erde´lyi et al. [ER10, EPR10], for
approval voting that are due to Hemaspaandra et al. [HHR07], and for SP-AV that are due to Erde´lyi
et al. [ENR09].
Theorem 3.1. Bucklin voting is resistant, vulnerable, and susceptible to the 22 types of control
defined in Section 2 as shown in Table 1.
Since Bucklin voting is the special case of fallback voting where each voter approves of ev-
ery candidate, we have the following corollary. Note that, by the first item of Corollary 3.2, the
resistances for Bucklin voting shown in the present paper imply all resistances for fallback voting
shown in [ER10, EPR10] except one: the destructive case of partition of voters in the tie-handling
model TP.
Corollary 3.2. 1. Fallback voting inherits all the NP-hardness lower bounds from Bucklin vot-
ing (i.e., if Bucklin voting is resistant to a control type CT then fallback voting is also resistant
to CT).
2. Bucklin voting inherits all the P membership upper bounds from fallback voting (i.e., if fall-
back voting is vulnerable to a control type CT then Bucklin voting is also vulnerable to CT).
2For example, think of a sports tournament in which certain teams (such as last year’s champion and the team hosting
this year’s championship) are given an exemption from qualification.
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Bucklin Voting Fallback Voting SP-AV Approval
Control by Const. Dest. Const. Dest. Const. Dest. Const. Dest.
Adding Candidates (unlimited) R R R R R R I V
Adding Candidates (limited) R R R R R R I V
Deleting Candidates R R R R R R V I
Partition of Candidates TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: V TE: I
TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: I TP: I
Run-off Partition of Candidates TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: V TE: I
TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: I TP: I
Adding Voters R V R V R V R V
Deleting Voters R V R V R V R V
Partition of Voters TE: R TE: S TE: R TE: S TE: R TE: V TE: R TE: V
TP: R TP: S TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: V
Table 1: Overview of results and comparison with known results. Key: I = immune, S = suscepti-
ble, R = resistant, V = vulnerable, TE = ties eliminate, and TP = ties promote. Results new to this
paper are in boldface.
3.2 Susceptibility
If an election system E satisfies the “unique” variant of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference3
(Unique-WARP, for short), then E is immune to constructive control by adding candidates (by
adding a limited number of candidates), and this observation has been applied to approval vot-
ing [BTT92, HHR07]. Unlike approval voting but just as fallback voting, Bucklin voting does not
satisfy Unique-WARP.
Proposition 3.3. Bucklin voting does not satisfy Unique-WARP.
Proof. Consider the election (C,V ) with candidate set C = {a,b,c,d} and voter collection V =
{v1,v2, . . . ,v6}:
(C,V )
v1 = v2 = v3 : a c b d
v4 = v5 : b d c a
v6 : d a c b
Candidate a is the unique Bucklin winner of the election (C,V ), reaching the strict majority
threshold on level 2 with score2(C,V )(a) = 4. By removing candidate b from the election, we get
the subelection (C′,V ) with C′ = {a,c,d}. There is no candidate on level 1 who passes the strict
majority threshold. However, there are two candidates on the second level with a strict majority,
namely candidates a and c. Since score2(C′,V )(c) = 5 > 4 = score
2
(C′,V )(a), the unique Bucklin winner
of the subelection (C′,V ) is candidate c. Thus, Bucklin voting does not satisfy Unique-WARP. ❑
Indeed, as we will now show, Bucklin voting is susceptible to each of our 22 control types. Our
proofs make use of the results of [HHR07] that provide general proofs of and links between certain
3This axiom says that the unique winner w of any election is also the unique winner of every subelection including w.
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susceptibility cases. For the sake of self-containment, we state their results, as Theorems A.1, A.2,
and A.3, in the appendix.
We start with susceptibility to candidate control.
Lemma 3.4. Bucklin voting is susceptible to constructive and destructive control by adding candi-
dates (in both the “limited” and the “unlimited” case), by deleting candidates, and by partition of
candidates (with or without run-off and for each in both model TE and model TP).
Proof. From Theorem A.1 and the fact that Bucklin voting is a voiced voting system,4 it follows
that Bucklin voting is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates, and to destructive
control by adding candidates (in both the “limited” and the “unlimited” case).
Now, consider the election (C,V ) given in the proof of Proposition 3.3. The unique Bucklin
winner of the election is candidate a. Partition C into C1 = {a,c,d} and C2 = {b}. The unique
Bucklin winner of subelection (C1,V ) is candidate c, as shown in the proof of Proposition 3.3. In
both partition and run-off partition of candidates and for each in both tie-handling models, TE and
TP, candidate b runs against candidate c in the final stage of the election. The unique Bucklin winner
is in each case candidate c. Thus, Bucklin voting is susceptible to destructive control by partition of
candidates (with or without run-off and for each in both model TE and model TP).
By Theorem A.3, Bucklin voting is also susceptible to destructive control by deleting candi-
dates. By Theorem A.2, Bucklin voting is also susceptible to constructive control by adding candi-
dates (in both the “limited” and the “unlimited” case).
Now, changing the roles of a and c makes c our distinguished candidate. In election (C,V ), c
loses against candidate a. By partitioning the candidates as described above, c becomes the unique
Bucklin winner of the election. Thus, Bucklin voting is susceptible to constructive control by par-
tition of candidates (with or without run-off and for each in both tie-handling models, TE and TP).
❑
We now turn to susceptibility to voter control.
Lemma 3.5. Bucklin voting is susceptible to constructive and destructive control by adding voters,
by deleting voters, and by partition of voters (in both model TE and model TP).
Proof. Consider the election (C,V ), where C = {a,b,c,d} is the set of candidates and V =
{v1,v2,v3,v4} is the collection of voters with the following preferences:
(C,V )
v1 : a c b d
v2 : d c a b
v3 : b a c d
v4 : b a c d
4An election system is said to be voiced if the single candidate in any one-candidate election always wins.
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We partition V into V1 = {v1,v2} and V2 = {v3,v4}. Thus we split (C,V ) into two subelections:
(C,V1) and (C,V2)
v1 : a c b d
v2 : d c a b
v3 : b a c d
v4 : b a c d
Clearly, candidate a is the unique Bucklin winner of (C,V ). However, c is the unique Bucklin
winner of (C,V1) and b is the unique Bucklin winner of (C,V2), and so a is not promoted to the
final stage. Thus, Bucklin voting is susceptible to destructive control by partition of voters in both
tie-handling models, TE and TP.
By Theorem A.1 and the fact that Bucklin voting is a voiced voting system, Bucklin voting
is susceptible to destructive control by deleting voters. By Theorem A.2, Bucklin voting is also
susceptible to constructive control by adding voters.
By changing the roles of a and c again, we can see that Bucklin voting is susceptible to con-
structive control by partition of voters in both model TE and model TP. By Theorem A.3, Bucklin
voting is also susceptible to constructive control by deleting voters. Finally, again by Theorem A.2,
Bucklin voting is susceptible to destructive control by adding voters. ❑
3.3 Candidate Control
Fallback voting is a hybrid system combining Bucklin voting with approval voting. While fallback
and approval voting behave quite differently with respect to immunity/vulnerability/resistance to
control (contrast the results of Hemaspaandra et al. on approval voting [HHR07] with those of
Erde´lyi et al. [ER10, EPR10] on fallback voting, see Table 1), Bucklin voting seems to behave
equally well as fallback voting in terms of control resistance. In particular, like fallback voting,
Bucklin voting is also fully resistant to candidate control.
Theorem 3.6. Bucklin voting is resistant to each of the 14 standard types of candidate control.
All reductions except one (namely that for constructive control by deleting candidates, see
Lemma 3.13) apply Construction 3.8 below. This construction is based on that for fallback vot-
ing [ER10]; however, there are significant differences. In fallback voting, the disapproved candi-
dates need not be ranked and can safely be ignored, since they cannot score points. In Bucklin
voting, however, there are no disapproved candidates, so every candidate has to be placed at a suit-
able position in each vote to make the reduction work. Thus the reductions for Bucklin voting will
be more specific and the arguments more involved. Also, since every candidate can potentially score
points in Bucklin voting, no matter what his or her position in a vote is, we have to use a restricted
version of HITTING SET , which by Lemma 3.7 is also NP-complete:
Name: RESTRICTED HITTING SET.
Instance: A set B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bm}, a collection S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of nonempty subsets Si ⊆ B
such that n > m, and a positive integer k < m.
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Question: Does S have a hitting set of size at most k, i.e., is there a set B′ ⊆ B with ‖B′‖ ≤ k such
that for each i, Si ∩B′ 6= /0?
We first need to show that RESTRICTED HITTING SET is NP-complete in order to apply Con-
struction 3.8 in the proof of Theorem 3.6.
Lemma 3.7. RESTRICTED HITTING SET is NP-complete.
Proof. It is immediate that RESTRICTED HITTING SET is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we
reduce the (general) HITTING SET problem to RESTRICTED HITTING SET. Given an instance
( ˆB, ˆS , ˆk) of HITTING SET , where ˆB = {b1,b2, . . . ,bmˆ} is a set, ˆS = {S1,S2, . . . ,Snˆ} is a collection
of nonempty subsets of ˆB, and ˆk ≤ mˆ is a positive integer, define the following instance (B,S ,k) of
RESTRICTED HITTING SET:
B =
{
ˆB∪{a} if nˆ ≤ mˆ
ˆB if nˆ > mˆ
S =
{
ˆS ∪{Snˆ+1,Snˆ+2, . . . ,Smˆ+2} if nˆ ≤ mˆ
ˆS if nˆ > mˆ
k =
{
ˆk+1 if nˆ ≤ mˆ
ˆk if nˆ > mˆ,
where
Snˆ+1 = Snˆ+2 = · · ·= Smˆ+2 = {a}.
Let n be the number of members of S and m be the number of elements of B. Note that if nˆ > mˆ
then (B,S ,k) = ( ˆB, ˆS , ˆk), so n = nˆ > mˆ = m; and if nˆ ≤ mˆ then n = mˆ+2 > mˆ+1 = m. Thus, in
both cases (B,S ,k) fulfills the restriction of RESTRICTED HITTING SET.
It is easy to see that ˆS has a hitting set of size at most ˆk if and only if S has a hitting set
of size at most k. In particular, assuming nˆ ≤ mˆ, if ˆS has a hitting set B′ of size at most ˆk then
B′∪{a} is a hitting set of size at most k = ˆk+1 for S ; and if ˆS has no hitting set of size at most ˆk
then S can have no hitting set of size at most k = ˆk+1 (because a 6∈ ˆB, so {a}∩Si = /0 for each i,
1 ≤ i ≤ nˆ). ❑
Construction 3.8. Let (B,S ,k) be a given instance of RESTRICTED HITTING SET, where B =
{b1,b2, . . . ,bm} is a set, S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} is a collection of nonempty subsets Si ⊆ B such that
n > m, and k < m is a positive integer. (Thus, n > m > k ≥ 1.)
Define the election (C,V ), where C = B∪{c,d,w} is the candidate set and where V consists of
the following 6n(k+1)+4m+11 voters:
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# For each . . . number of voters ranking of candidates
1 2m+1 c d B w
2 2n+2k(n−1)+3 c w d B
3 2n(k+1)+5 w c d B
4 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 2(k+1) d Si c w (B−Si)
5 j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} 2 d b j w c (B−{b j})
6 2(k+1) d w c B
We now give a detailed proof of Theorem 3.6 (except for the case of constructive control by
deleting candidates, which will be handled separately in Lemma 3.13) via Construction 3.8 in Lem-
mas 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12. The proofs of these lemmas in turn will make use of Lemma 3.9 below.
Lemma 3.9. Consider the election (C,V ) constructed according to Construction 3.8 from a RE-
STRICTED HITTING SET instance (B,S ,k).
1. c is the unique level 2 BV winner of ({c,d,w},V ).
2. If S has a hitting set B′ of size k, then w is the unique BV winner of election (B′∪{c,d,w},V ).
3. Let D ⊆ B∪{d,w}. If c is not a unique BV winner of election (D∪{c},V ), then there exists
a set B′ ⊆ B such that
(a) D = B′∪{d,w},
(b) w is the unique level 2 BV winner of election (B′∪{c,d,w},V ), and
(c) B′ is a hitting set for S of size at most k.
Proof. For the first part, note that there is no level 1 BV winner in election ({c,d,w},V ) and we
have the following level 2 scores in this election:
score2({c,d,w},V )(c) = 6n(k+1)+2(m− k)+9,
score2({c,d,w},V )(d) = 2n(k+1)+4m+2k+3, and
score2({c,d,w},V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+2m+10.
Since n > m (which implies n > k), we have:
score2({c,d,w},V )(c)− score
2
({c,d,w},V )(d) = 4n(k+1)− (2m+4k)+6 > 0, and
score2({c,d,w},V )(c)− score
2
({c,d,w},V )(w) = 2n(k+1)− (2k+1) > 0.
Thus, c is the unique level 2 BV winner of ({c,d,w},V ).
For the second part, suppose that B′ is a hitting set for S of size k. Then there is no level 1 BV
winner in election (B′∪{c,d,w},V ), and we have the following level 2 scores:
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(c) = 4n(k+1)+2(m− k)+9,
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(d) = 2n(k+1)+4m+2k+3,
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+2(m− k)+10,
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(b j) ≤ 2n(k+1)+2 for all b j ∈ B′.
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It follows that w is the unique level 2 BV winner of election (B′∪{c,d,w},V ).
For the third part, let D ⊆ B∪{d,w}. Suppose c is not a unique BV winner of election (D∪
{c},V ).
(3a) Other than c, only w has a strict majority of votes on the second level and only w can tie or
beat c in (D∪{c},V ). Thus, since c is not a unique BV winner of election (D∪{c},V ), w is
clearly in D. In (D∪{c},V ), candidate w has no level 1 strict majority, and candidate c has
already on level 2 a strict majority. Thus, w must tie or beat c on level 2. For a contradiction,
suppose d /∈ D. Then
score2(D∪{c},V )(c)≥ 4n(k+1)+2m+11.
The level 2 score of w is
score2(D∪{c},V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+2m+10,
which contradicts our assumption, that w ties or beats c on level 2. Thus, D = B′ ∪{d,w},
where B′ ⊆ B.
(3b) This part follows immediately from part (3a).
(3c) Let ℓ be the number of sets in S not hit by B′. We have that
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+10+2(m−‖B
′‖),
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(c) = 2(m− k)+4n(k+1)+9+2(k+1)ℓ.
From part (3a) we know that
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(w)≥ score
2
(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(c),
so
4n(k+1)+10+2(m−‖B′‖) ≥ 2(m− k)+4n(k+1)+9+2(k+1)ℓ.
The above inequality implies
1 > 1
2
≥ ‖B′‖− k+(k+1)ℓ≥ 0,
so ‖B′‖− k+(k+1)ℓ= 0. Thus ℓ= 0, and it follows that B′ is a hitting set for S of size k.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.9. ❑
Lemma 3.10. Bucklin voting is resistant to constructive and destructive control by adding candi-
dates (both in the limited and the unlimited version of the problem).
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.4. NP-hardness follows immediately from Lemmas 3.7
and 3.9, via mapping the RESTRICTED HITTING SET instance (B,S ,k) to the instance
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1. (({c,d,w}∪B,V ),w,k) of Constructive Control by Adding a Limited Number of Candidates,
2. (({c,d,w}∪B,V ),c,k) of Destructive Control by Adding a Limited Number of Candidates,
3. (({c,d,w} ∪B,V ),w) of Constructive Control by Adding an Unlimited Number of Candi-
dates, and
4. (({c,d,w}∪B,V ),c) of Destructive Control by Adding an Unlimited Number of Candidates.
where in each case c, d, and w are the qualified candidates and B is the set of spoiler candidates. ❑
Lemma 3.11. Bucklin voting is resistant to destructive control by deleting candidates.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.4. To show the problem NP-hard, let (C,V ) be the elec-
tion resulting from a RESTRICTED HITTING SET instance (B,S ,k) according to Construction 3.8,
and let c be the distinguished candidate.
We claim that S has a hitting set of size at most k if and only if c can be prevented from being
a unique BV winner by deleting at most m− k candidates.
From left to right: Suppose S has a hitting set B′ of size k. Delete the m− k candidates B−B′.
Now, both candidates c and w have a strict majority on level 2, but
score2({c,d,w}∪B′ ,V )(c) = 4n(k+1)+2(m− k)+9,
score2({c,d,w}∪B′ ,V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+2(m− k)+10,
so w is the unique level 2 BV winner of this election.
From right to left: Suppose that c can be prevented from being a unique BV winner by deleting
at most m− k candidates. Let D′ ⊆ B∪ {d,w} be the set of deleted candidates (so c /∈ D′) and
D = (C−D′)−{c}. It follows immediately from Lemma 3.9 that D = B′∪{d,w}, where B′ is a
hitting set for S of size at most k. ❑
Lemma 3.12. Bucklin voting is resistant to constructive and destructive control by partition of
candidates and by run-off partition of candidates (for each in both tie-handling models, TE and TP).
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.4, so it remains to show NP-hardness. For the construc-
tive cases, map the given RESTRICTED HITTING SET instance (B,S ,k) to the election (C,V ) from
Construction 3.8 with distinguished candidate w.
We claim that S has a hitting set of size at most k if and only if w can be made the unique
BV winner by exerting control via any of our four control scenarios (partition of candidates with or
without run-off, and for each in either tie-handling model, TE and TP).
From left to right: Suppose S has a hitting set B′ ⊆ B of size k. Partition the set of candidates
into the two subsets C1 = B′∪{c,d,w} and C2 =C−C1. According to Lemma 3.9, w is the unique
level 2 BV winner of subelection (C1,V ) = (B′ ∪{c,d,w},V ). Since (no matter whether we have
a run-off or not, and regardless of the tie-handling rule used) the opponents of w in the final stage
(if there are any opponents at all) each are candidates from B. Since n > m, w has a majority in the
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final stage on the first level with a score of 4n(k+ 1)+ 9. Thus, w is the unique BV winner of the
resulting election.
From right to left: Suppose w can be made the unique BV winner via any of our four control
scenarios. Since c is not a BV winner of the election, there is a subset D ⊆ B∪{d,w} of candidates
such that c is not a unique BV winner of the election (D∪{c},V ). By Lemma 3.9, there exists a
hitting set for S of size at most k.
For the four destructive cases, we simply change the roles of c and w in the above argument. ❑
Next we handle the one missing candidate-control case for Bucklin voting. Our reduction in this
case is from the NP-complete problem HITTING SET , which is defined as follows (see [GJ79]):
Name: HITTING SET .
Instance: A set B= {b1,b2, . . . ,bm}, a collection S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of nonempty subsets Si ⊆ B,
and a positive integer k ≤ m.
Question: Does S have a hitting set of size at most k, i.e., is there a set B′ ⊆ B with ‖B′‖ ≤ k such
that for each i, Si ∩B′ 6= /0?
Lemma 3.13. Bucklin voting is resistant to constructive control by deleting candidates.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.4. To prove NP-hardness we give a reduction from
HITTING SET . Let (B,S ,k) be a HITTING SET instance with B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bm} a set, S =
{S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} a collection of nonempty subsets Si ⊆ B, and k ≤ m a positive integer. Define the
election (C,V ) with candidate set C = B∪C′ ∪D∪ E ∪ F ∪ {w}, where C′ = {c1,c2, . . . ,ck+1},
D = {d1,d2, . . . ,ds}, E = {e1,e2, . . . ,en}, F = { f1, . . . , fn+k}, w is the distinguished candidate, and
the number of candidates in D is s = ∑ni=1 si with si = n+ k−‖Si‖, so s = n2 + kn−∑ni=1 ‖Si‖.
For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Di = {d1+∑i−1j=1 s j , . . . ,d∑ij=1 s j}. Define V to be the following collection of
2(n+ k+1)+1 voters:
# For each . . . number of voters ranking of candidates
1 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 Si Di w C′ E (D−Di) (B−Si) F
2 j ∈ {1, . . . ,k+1} 1 E (C′−{c j}) c j B D w F
3 k+1 w F C′ E B D
4 n C′ D F B w E
5 1 C′ w D F E B
There is no unique BV winner in election (C,V ), since the candidates in C′ and candidate w are
level n+ k+1 BV winners.
We claim that S has a hitting set of size k if and only if w can be made the unique BV winner
by deleting at most k candidates.
From left to right: Suppose S has a hitting set B′ of size k. Delete the corresponding candidates.
Now, w is the unique level n+ k BV winner of the resulting election.
From right to left: Suppose w can be made the unique BV winner by deleting at most k can-
didates. Since k + 1 candidates other than w have a strict majority on level n+ k+ 1 in election
(C,V ), after deleting at most k candidates, there is still at least one candidate other than w with a
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strict majority of approvals on level n+ k+ 1. However, since w was made the unique BV winner
by deleting at most k candidates, w must be the unique BV winner on a level lower than or equal to
n+ k. This is possible only if in all n votes of the first voter group w moves forward by at least one
position. This, however, is possible only if S has a hitting set B′ of size k. ❑
3.4 Voter Control
We now turn to voter control for Bucklin voting. Our reductions are from the NP-complete problem
EXACT COVER BY THREE-SETS (X3C, for short), which is defined as follows (see [GJ79]):
Name: EXACT COVER BY THREE-SETS (X3C).
Instance: A set B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3m}, m ≥ 1, and a collection S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of subsets
Si ⊆ B with ‖Si‖= 3 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Question: Is there a subcollection S ′ ⊆ S such that each element of B occurs in exactly one set
in S ′?
Theorem 3.14. Bucklin voting is resistant to constructive control by adding voters, by deleting
voters, and by partition of voters in model TE and model TP, but is vulnerable to destructive control
by adding and by deleting voters.
Lemma 3.15. Bucklin voting is resistant to constructive control by adding voters.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.5. Let (B,S ) be an X3C instance, where B =
{b1,b2, . . . ,b3m} is a set with m > 1 and S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} is a collection of subsets Si ⊆ B
with ‖Si‖= 3 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (Note that X3C is trivial to solve for m = 1.)
Define the election (C,V ∪V ′), where C = B∪{w}∪D with D = {d1, . . . ,dn(3m−4)} is the set
of candidates, w is the distinguished candidate, and V ∪V ′ is the following collection of n+m− 2
voters:
1. V is the collection of m−2 registered voters of the form: B D w.
2. V ′ is the collection of unregistered voters, where for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of
the form: Di Si w (D−Di) (B−Si), where Di = {d(i−1)(3m−4)+1, . . . ,di(3m−4)}.
Since b1 ∈ B has a majority already on the first level, w is not a unique BV winner in (C,V ).
We claim that S has an exact cover for B if and only if w can be made a unique BV winner by
adding at most m voters from V ′.
From left to right: Suppose S contains an exact cover for B. Let V ′′ contain the correspond-
ing voters from V ′ (i.e., voters of the form Di Si w (D−Di) (B−Si), for each Si in the ex-
act cover) and add V ′′ to the election. It follows that score3m+1(C,V∪V ′′)(d j) = m− 1 for all d j ∈ D,
score3m+1(C,V∪V ′′)(b j) = m−1 for all b j ∈ B, and score
3m+1
(C,V∪V ′′)(w) = m. Thus, only w has a strict major-
ity up to the (3m+1)st level and so w is the unique level 3m+1 BV winner of the election.
From right to left: Let V ′′ ⊆ V ′ be such that ‖V ′′‖ ≤ m and w is the unique winner of election
(C,V ∪V ′′). Since w must in particular beat every b j ∈ B up to the (3m+1)st level, it follows that
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‖V ′′‖= m and each b j ∈ B can gain only one additional point. Thus, the m voters in V ′′ correspond
to an exact cover for B. ❑
Lemma 3.16. Bucklin voting is resistant to constructive control by deleting voters.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.5. Let (B,S ) be an X3C instance as above. Define the
election (C,V ), where C =B∪{c,w}∪D∪F∪G is the set of candidates with D= {d1,d2, . . . ,d3nm},
F = { f1, f2, . . . , f3n(m−1)}, and G = {g1,g2, . . . ,g3m(m−1)}, and where w is the distinguished candi-
date. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3m, define ℓ j = ‖{Si ∈ S |b j ∈ Si}‖, and for each i,1 ≤ i ≤ n, define5
Bi = {b j ∈ B | i ≤ n− ℓ j},
Di = {d(i−1)3m+1, . . . ,d3im−‖Bi‖}, and
Fi = { f(i−1)(3m−3)+1, . . . , fi(3m−3)}.
Also, for each k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m−1, define Gk = {g3m(k−1)+1, . . . ,g3mk}. Let V consist of the following
collection of 2n+m−1 voters:
# For each . . . number of ranking of candidates
voters
1 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 Si c Fi D (B−Si) G (F −Fi) w
2 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 Bi Di w F (D−Di) (B−Bi) G c
3 k ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1} 1 c Gk F D (G−Gk) B w
Candidate c is the unique level 4 BV winner in the election (C,V ).
We claim that S has an exact cover for B if and only if w can be made the unique BV winner
by deleting at most m voters.
From left to right: Suppose S contains an exact cover for B. By deleting the corresponding
voters from the first voter group, we have the following level 3m+1 scores in the resulting election
(C,V ′):
score3m+1(C,V ′)(w) = n,
score3m+1(C,V ′)(bi) = score
3m+1
(C,V ′)(c) = n−1 for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3m,
score3m+1(C,V ′)(d j) = 1 or score
3m+1
(C,V ′)(d j) = 0 for all d j ∈ D, and
score3m+1(C,V ′)( f j) = score3m+1(C,V ′)(gk) = 1 for all f j ∈ F and all gk ∈ G.
Since now there are 2n− 1 voters in the election, candidate w is the first candidate having a strict
majority, so w is the unique BV winner of election (C,V ′).
From right to left: Suppose w can be made the unique BV winner by deleting at most m voters.
Since w doesn’t score any points on any of the first 3m levels (see Footnote 5), neither c nor any
of the bi can have a strict majority on any of these levels. In particular, candidate c must have lost
exactly m points (up to the (3m+1)st level) after deletion, and this is possible only if the m deleted
5Note that Di = /0 if ‖Bi‖= 3m and that w is always ranked at or later than the (3m+1)st position.
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voters are all from the first or third voter group. On the other hand, each bi ∈ B must have lost at
least one point (up to the (3m+1)st level) after deletion, and this is possible only if exactly m voters
were deleted from the first voter group. These m voters correspond to an exact cover for B. ❑
Lemma 3.17. Bucklin voting is vulnerable to destructive control by adding and deleting voters.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.5. The polynomial-time algorithms that solve the two
control problems for fallback voting [ER10] can easily be adapted (e.g., by adjusting the input
format from fallback elections to that for Bucklin elections) to work for Bucklin voting as well,
as Bucklin voting is the special case of fallback voting where each voter approves of all candi-
dates. ❑
Lemma 3.18. Bucklin voting is resistant to constructive control by partition of voters in both tie-
handling models, TE and TP.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.5. To show NP-hardness we reduce X3C to our control
problems. Let (B,S ) be an X3C instance with B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3m}, m ≥ 1, and a collection
S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of subsets Si ⊆ B with ‖Si‖ = 3 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We define the election
(C,V ), where C = B∪{c,w,x} ∪D∪E ∪F ∪G is the set of candidates with D = {d1, . . . ,d3nm},
E = {e1, . . . ,e(3m−1)(m+1)}, F = { f1, . . . , f(3m+1)(m−1)}, and G = {g1, . . . ,gn(3m−3)}, and where w is
the distinguished candidate. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3m, define ℓ j = ‖{Si ∈ S |b j ∈ Si}‖, and for each
i,1 ≤ i ≤ n, define
Bi = {b j ∈ B | i ≤ n− ℓ j},
Di = {d(i−1)3m+1, . . . ,d3im−‖Bi‖}, and
Gi = {g(i−1)(3m−3)+1, . . . ,gi(3m−3)}.
Also, for each k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m+1, define Ek = {e(3m−1)(k−1)+1, . . . ,e(3m−1)k}, and for each l, 1 ≤ l ≤
m−1, define Fl = { f(3m+1)(l−1)+1, . . . , f(3m+1)l}. Let V consist of the following 2n+2m voters:
# For each . . . number of ranking of candidates
voters
1 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 c Si Gi (G−Gi) F D E (B−Si) w x
2 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 Bi Di w G E (D−Di) F (B−Bi) c x
3 k ∈ {1, . . . ,m+1} 1 x c Ek F (E −Ek) G D B w
4 l ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1} 1 Fl c (F −Fl) G D E B w x
In this election, candidate c is the unique level 2 BV winner with a level 2 score of n+m+1.
We claim S has an exact cover S ′ for B if and only if w can be made the unique BV winner of
the resulting election by partition of voters in both tie-handling models TE and TP.
From left to right: Suppose S has an exact cover S ′ for B. Partition V the following way. Let
V1 consist of:
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• the m voters of the first group that correspond to the exact cover (i.e., those m voters of the
form c Si Gi (G−Gi) F D E (B−Si) w x for which Si ∈S ′) and
• the m + 1 voters of the third group (i.e., all voters of the form
x c Ek F (E −Ek) G D B w.
Let V2 =V −V1. In subelection (C,V1), candidate x is the unique level 1 BV winner. In subelection
(C,V2), candidate w is the first candidate who has a strict majority and moves on to the final round
of the election. Thus there are w and x in the final run-off, which w wins with a strict majority on
the first level. Since both subelections, (C,V1) and (C,V2), have unique BV winners, candidate w
can be made the unique BV winner by partition of voters in both tie-handling models, TE and TP.
From right to left: Suppose that w can be made the unique BV winner by exerting control by
partition of voters. Let (V1,V2) be such a successful partition. Since w wins the resulting two-
stage election, w has to win at least one of the subelections (say, w wins (C,V1)). If candidate c
participates in the final round, he or she wins the election with a strict majority no later than on the
second level, no matter which other candidates move forward to the final election. That means that
in both subelections, (C,V1) and (C,V2), c must not be a BV winner. Only in the second voter group
candidate w (who has to be a BV winnner in (C,V1)) gets points higher than on the second-to-last
level. So w has to be a level 3m+1 BV winner in (C,V1), which implies that there have to be voters
from the second voter group in V1. Therefore, in subelection (C,V2) only candidate x can prevent c
from moving forward to the final round. Since x is always placed behind c in all votes except those
votes from the third voter group, x has to be a level 1 BV winner in (C,V2). Since in (C,V1) it is not
possible that a candidate can tie with w on the (3m+1)st level, w has to be the unique level 3m+1
BV winner in (C,V1). Thus both elections (C,V1) and (C,V2) have unique BV winners and so the
construction works for both tie-handling models, TE and TP.
It remains to show that S has an exact cover S ′ for B. Since w has to win (C,V1) with the
votes from the second voter group, not all voters from the first voter group can be in V1 (otherwise
c would have n points already on the first level). On the other hand, there can be at most m voters
from the first voter group in V2 because otherwise x would not be a level 1 BV winner in (C,V2).
To ensure that no candidate contained in B has the same score as w, namely n points, and gets these
points on an earlier level than w in (C,V1), there have to be exactly m voters from the first group in
V2 and these voters correspond to an exact cover for B. ❑
4 Conclusions and Open Questions
We have shown that Bucklin voting is resistant to all standard types of candidate control and all
standard types of constructive control. In total, it possesses at least 18 resistances to the 22 com-
monly studied control types, it has at least two (and can have no more than four) vulnerabilities, and
two cases remain open: destructive control by partition of voters in both tie-handling models, TE
and TP. For comparison, recall from Table 1 that, for destructive control by partition of voters, ap-
proval voting is vulnerable both in model TE and TP, SP-AV is vulnerable in model TE but resistant
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in model TP, and fallback voting is resistant in model TP and it is open whether fallback voting is
vulnerable or resistant to this control type in model TE.
Only SP-AV and fallback voting are currently known to be resistant to one more control type
than Bucklin voting. However, Bucklin voting is arguably a simpler and more natural voting system;
for example, unlike SP-AV and fallback voting, it is a majority-consistent voting rule.
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A Some Results of [HHR07] Used in Section 3.2
Theorem A.1 ([HHR07]). 1. If a voiced voting system is susceptible to destructive control by
partition of voters (in model TE or TP), then it is susceptible to destructive control by deleting
voters.
2. Each voiced voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates.
3. Each voiced voting system is susceptible to destructive control by adding candidates.6
Theorem A.2 ([HHR07]). 1. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by adding
candidates if and only if it is susceptible to destructive control by deleting candidates.
2. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates if and only if it
is susceptible to destructive control by adding candidates.
3. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by adding voters if and only if it is
susceptible to destructive control by deleting voters.
4. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting voters if and only if it is
susceptible to destructive control by adding voters.
Theorem A.3 ([HHR07]). 1. If a voting system is susceptible to constructive control by parti-
tion of voters (in model TE or TP), then it is susceptible to constructive control by deleting
candidates.
2. If a voting system is susceptible to constructive control by partition or run-off partition of
candidates (in model TE or TP), then it is susceptible to constructive control by deleting
candidates.
3. If a voting system is susceptible to constructive control by partition of voters in model TE,
then it is susceptible to constructive control by deleting voters.
4. If a voting system is susceptible to destructive control by partition or run-off partition of
candidates (in model TE or TP), then it is susceptible to destructive control by deleting can-
didates.
6Following Bartholdi et al. [BTT92], Hemaspaandra et al. [HHR07] considered only the case of control by adding a
limited number of candidates—the “unlimited” case was introduced only in (the conference precursors of) [FHHR09a].
However, it is easy to see that all results about control by adding candidates stated in Theorems A.1, A.2, and A.3 hold
true in both the limited and the unlimited case.
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